Why India's treaty hubris could backfire

Following the Modi-led regime's announcement that India was unilaterally abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in reaction to the Pahalgam incident, several op-eds have reviewed New Delhi’s move and its legality.

Signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi, Pakistan’s capital at the time, the treaty is basically an elaborate water-sharing mechanism between the two countries. It allocates control of the eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — to India and grants Pakistan rights over the western rivers —Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Fortunately, the treaty survived the wars of 1965 and 1971, the Kargil conflict, and numerous regimes in both countries. Due to this, the World Bank, being the guarantor of this pact, has continually showcased it as a rare success in international water diplomacy.

Before deliberating on the legal, diplomatic and geopolitical implications of India’s one-sided approach, I asked a simple question of ChatGPT: Can India unilaterally suspend the Indus Waters Treaty? I received this response: “No, India cannot unilaterally suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) without following the provisions outlined in the agreement”. It further stated: “The treaty includes a dispute resolution mechanism and stipulates that any changes or suspension of the treaty would require mutual agreement or, in some cases, be subject to third-party arbitration. In practice, unilaterally suspending or abrogating the treaty would be a highly complex and politically sensitive move, potentially leading to significant diplomatic and legal consequences. Any such action would likely escalate tensions between India and Pakistan and could have broader international implications”. 

Quoted words, no tampering, no editing. After thoroughly reading the 85-page treaty document, this is what any sane and unbiased person would assert about the Indian stance of unilaterally suspending the treaty.

From a legal perspective, the devil is in the details. The treaty document does not include any explicit abrogation clause. Article XII states (3): “The provisions of this treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments”. The same article further adds that (4): “The provisions of this treaty, or the provisions of this treaty as modified under the provisions of Paragraph (3), shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments”.

In the whole treaty, the word ‘terminate’ is used only once in the above context. Hence, as per Article XII, any attempt at unilateral withdrawal is legally void and internationally untenable. The pact has made it clear that the only legally permissible options are continuation, amendment or termination through mutual consent of both governments. This is a critical legal reality that there is no space for unilateralism. Thus, any Indian assertion or action of unilateral exit from the treaty directly violates the principles of international law.

The reality is that the Modi regime has been finding excuses to revoke the IWT for quite some time. Hence, this is not the first time the treaty has come under political fire. In 2016, following the Uri attack, Prime Minister Modi stated that “Blood and water cannot flow together.” Similar threats have been issued by other Indian political leaders from time to time. Pakistan, being a lower riparian country, has been regularly threatened with water aggression.

To punish Pakistan, there are voices in India calling for the construction of storage facilities on the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — to choke Pakistan’s water supply. While New Delhi has cultivated such intentions, it lacks the necessary storage infrastructure on these rivers. Experts have warned that India will face two fundamental challenges even if it tries to build such facilities.

First, the steep terrain of the Himalayas makes it nearly impossible to divert water from these rivers to the Indian mainland. Second, the Kashmir Valley, through which these rivers flow, has surplus water for agriculture, requiring lift irrigation — water that must be raised using pumps. So even if India builds dams, what would it do with the excess water? Critics argue that rather than securing a strategic edge, India could create new vulnerabilities, as such critical infrastructure in an environmentally sensitive and geopolitically conflict zone would enhance India’s burden.

From a diplomatic point of view, India’s unilateral decision legitimises the very kind of water weaponisation that New Delhi has long opposed. Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan, with whom India shares essential river systems, could certainly interpret this as a sign of India’s policy to act unilaterally whenever it deems necessary. 

Given this, future regional negotiations, particularly with Nepal over the Koshi and Gandak rivers and Bangladesh over the Ganga and Teesta, would be marred by a huge trust deficit. So, diplomatically, India would certainly be a loser in the long run.

In addition, New Delhi willfully opens dangerous geopolitical avenues with Beijing. China, being the upper riparian of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), could cite the same logic in any future confrontation with India. Undoubtedly, China has proven expertise and resources to build hydropower infrastructure in the most difficult terrains.

In the long run, China could devise a similar rationale, citing climate change and population factors to potentially cut or redirect water flows to northeast India. This is also why New Delhi must not act unilaterally in sheer hubris. Such a move has massive legal, diplomatic, and geopolitical implications for India and the region in the long run.

Sanity must prevail, but unfortunately, New Delhi has been behaving with extreme arrogance. During the last several years, the US-India strategic bonhomie has steadily deepened, also mainly due to increasing Sino-US acrimony and trade war. Several developments such as the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA), the 2019 Industrial Security Agreement (ISA) and the 2020 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) have led to a closer strategic cooperation between the US and India, having implications for China and Pakistan.

The rejuvenation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad, comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US in the Indo-Pacific and close security cooperation between India and the US at the India-Israel-UAE-United States (I2-U2) forum, now labelled as the Middle Eastern Quad are some of the steps demonstrating ever-expanding US-India strategic and security cooperation. These Indo-US moves have further increased India’s hubris, and statements coming from New Delhi are unfortunately exhibiting more disdain towards Pakistan.

The writer teaches at the University of Malakand. He can be reached at: [email protected]

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

Originally published in The News